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'Without animals,' says Peter, a Maasai nomad interviewed in the New 
Internationalist1, 'life isn't worth living'.  
 
Sitting here in my inner-city backyard writing this, with a circle of 
attentive little upturned canine and feline faces surrounding me, and my 
cranky duck tugging at my shoelaces, I could not be in more heartfelt 
agreement. But how many people today would share this sentiment? For 
how many would it be football that makes life worth living, or cars, or 
opera, or ice-skating? Is there anything to ground the conviction that I 
want to defend here, that the company of non-human animals is a 
necessary part of human life, in a way that football, cars, opera and ice-
skating manifestly are not, and that we relinquish or forego it at our 
peril?  
 
There are two parts to this question. The first is, is it important for us, for 
our own well-being or the realization of our human potential, that we 
live in intimate commensal relations with animals? The second is, is it 
important for the environment that we live in such relations? Does the 
world need us to continue to live in our ancestral communalism with 
animals?  
 
My view is that our present estrangement, as human beings, from both 
the natural world (as evidenced in the environmental crisis) and from 
ourselves (as evidenced in the intense neuroticization of life in 
contemporary 'advanced' societies) is due at least in part to the 
progressive removal of animals from our day-to-day urban reality; 
consequently I shall argue that, in order to address both the 
environmental crisis and our own crisis of consciousness, we need to 
find ways of restoring animals to the human household. 
  
I cannot hope here to exhaust the discussion invited by this question, or 
even to do justice to its larger significance. I shall merely offer several 
relatively straightforward arguments in favour of human-animal 
commensality, and then offer a very personal reflection on the deeper 
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cosmological significance of these relations, as this has unfolded for me 
through my own experience.  
 
 
    
Our Need for Animal Company 
 
Firstly then, are intimate connections with animals foundational to our 
human well-being? It is by now a well-established research finding that 
people who enjoy the day-to-day friendship of animals, or who are, 
according to contemporary parlance, 'pet owners'2, are healthier in 
various respects than people who do not: they tend to visit the doctor less 
frequently, use less medication, have lower cholesterol and blood 
pressure levels, recover more quickly from illness and suffer less from 
feelings of loneliness.3 Indeed, it has been estimated that 'pet ownership' 
saves the Australian health care system one and a half billion dollars per 
year.4  
 
Why might this be so? One reason may be that companionate 
relationships with animals defuse a lot of the socially generated pressure 
in our lives. Animals are non-judgmental friends. They do not compete 
with us. Hence we can relax with them, and enjoy spontaneous affection 
and cathartic physical closeness: we can 'be ourselves' in the presence of 
such companions, since they have no socially acquired expectations of 
us. They offer us emotional and psychological release.  
 
Friendships with animals may be stress-reducing in a further way. 
Emotional involvement with creatures who do not share our human goals 
and aspirations, our system of values, enables us to gain an external 
perspective on those values. It enables us to imagine how odd or 
arbitrary our human priorities might appear from a non-human 
perspective. When revealed in this light, socially-prescribed imperatives 
have less hold on us - we can achieve a certain distance from them, a 
certain detachment. We become less driven, less enslaved to abstract 
ideals and images, and hence more receptive to our actual bodily and 
instinctual needs, more self-accepting, with all the implications for 
health and healing that flow from this.  
 
It does not seem too far-fetched, to me, to speculate that there may even 
be a direct physiological dependence of humans on animal 
companionship that would help to explain why people who enjoy that 
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companionship are healthier than others. Some evolutionary theorists are 
currently arguing that our ancestors' early genetic 'contract' with certain 
animals - particularly dogs - enabled us to develop the characteristics 
that now mark us as human. According to this theory5, it was our 
association with dogs - which was initiated at least in part by the dogs 
themselves, possibly as early as one hundred thousand years ago6 - 
which enabled our ancestors to dispense with something that is otherwise 
mandatory for mammalian predators, namely an acute sense of smell: 
when dogs agreed to join us in the hunt, they could henceforth do our 
sniffing for us. The advantage for us of delegating our scenting function 
in this way was that we could thereby dispense with our muzzle.  Sans 
muzzle, we could achieve frontal vision, and hence improved hand-eye 
co-ordination, where this in turn was a precondition for the development 
of our tool-making capability. The retraction of the muzzle also entailed 
the shrinkage and refinement of the tongue, which thereby became 
capable of the short, highly differentiated sounds required for speech.  
According to this theory then, it was through a functional inter-
dependence with dogs that we became human. (This theory adds an 
amazingly literal dimension to the Aboriginal myth of human origins 
recounted so beautifully by Deborah Bird Rose in her book, Dingo 
Makes Us Human.7) The deal for dogs, in this scenario, was of course 
that they received board and lodgings; history has resoundingly 
vindicated the proto-dogs' evolutionary choice.  
 
If this evolutionary story is accepted - and the fact that nearly all known 
human communities have included dogs helps to bear it out - then it is 
possible that human beings have a physiological need for contact with 
dogs. Our bodies may unconsciously respond to certain subtle canine 
emanations, just as women's bodies, for instance, unconsciously respond 
to the subtle menstrual signals emanating from their female house mates. 
If our compact with dogs indeed rested on certain evolutionary 
imperatives, then it is not unreasonable to suppose that that compact may 
be reinforced by other more direct, physiological forms of inter-
dependency. If all dogs were banished from our cities - and many 
indignant citizens are calling for just such a ban - a massive malaise in 
the human population might ensue. Such a malaise might take directly 
physical form, such as immunological decline; recent evidence that 
raising children without exposure to ('dirty') animals tends to weaken 
their immune systems, where this renders them susceptible to allergies, 
counts in favour of this kind of interpretation.  But the malaise might 
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also take a more psychological form - it might be more akin to the 
depression which is already present in epidemic proportions in our 
relatively animal-free 'advanced' industrial civilizations. It might 
manifest as a vague sense of incompleteness or meaninglessness, leading 
to emotional neediness and compensating material acquisitiveness. Or it 
might be experienced as an existential loneliness which no amount of 
intra-species socialising can assuage.  
 
Consider the latter possibility for a moment. If we have lived in intimate 
community with dogs, for instance, for anything up to a hundred 
thousand years, wouldn't it be likely that we would have a distinct 
psychological need for their company, a need that could not be satisfied 
by human substitutes? Anyone who habitually walks in open spaces with 
a close canine friend can testify to the unique appropriateness of dogs as 
walking companions. Bounding along with infectious interest and joy in 
their surroundings, they leave us free - free to think our own thoughts 
and to observe those surroundings keenly ourselves - while nevertheless 
staying faithfully within our orbit, maintaining an unobtrusive closeness 
with us. Alternatively, anyone who has spent time in Aboriginal 
settlements can testify to the feeling of comfort that a dog clan can lend 
to a community, provided of course that the dogs are not themselves a 
source of danger. Their constant mingling with the people, their presence 
at meetings and their forays onto the football field, their barking and 
carrying on amongst themselves on the margins of human activities, add 
a safe, convivial and companionable dimension to life, a dimension that 
has been entirely lost in the larger cities. Nor is it only dogs which 
provide a distinctive quality of companionship. To sit in the garden with 
an affectionate duck can afford a uniquely peaceful interlude in the daily 
round. To travel with horses or camels can give a far richer sense of 
journeying than can either solitary travel or travel with exclusively 
human company.  
 
In light of the emotional and psychological satisfactions that we have 
experienced for thousands of years in the wider social world of the 
'mixed community'8 of humans and animals then, isn't it reasonable to 
assume that, deprived of these satisfactions, we moderns might feel 
unfulfilled and obscurely lonely, even if we have never experienced 
these satisfactions at first hand, for ourselves. And mightn't this 




These are some of the reasons why it might be important for our own 
well-being to continue the ancient human tradition of living in mixed 
households or communities. But why might it be important for Nature 
itself that we honour and maintain our ancestral commensal links with 
animals?  
 
Why Nature Needs Us to Live in Company with Animals  
 
If animal companions help to make us less driven, competitive and  
acquisitive, as I argued earlier, then their presence in our lives works 
against the world-destroying ethos of capitalism, with its competitive 
individualism and consumerism. That is to say, if animals help to bring 
us down to earth, deflating our modern ambitions and pretensions by 
exposing them to inter-species scrutiny, then we shall be less anxious to 
remain in the race for success, wealth and power, where it is this race, on 
a mass scale, which is driving the engines of capitalism. Indeed, to the 
extent that  we share our lives with animals, we shall not only be less 
willing but less able to adapt to the regime of order and control, 
efficiency and discipline, which is a prerequisite of capitalist production: 
animals constantly disrupt our life and work with unpredictable 
contingencies - escapes, fights, sudden illnesses, injuries, embarrassing 
lapses. They bring an element of slapstick and anarchy into the cool, 
smart, self-absorbed world of business and public affairs. They make us 
miss work; they muss up the perfect clothes, perfect hair, that are needed 
to assure our 'professionalism', our presentability, in this public world; 
they strew shit and dirt around the manicured gardens, and leave paw 
marks through the tidy houses, that announce our hard-won social status. 
They gently lead us back from the obsessive quest which is definitive of 
the modern ethos  and which is at the root of the environmental crisis: 
the quest to usurp and transcend Nature,9 to place ourselves above and 
beyond its reach, to inhabit a kind of glossy advertiser's version of 
Plato's heaven, in which moth and rust doth not corrupt, because they are 
kept at bay by chemical warfare, and where thieves do not break in and 
steal, because the place is patrolled by security guards. In other words, 
by staying in touch with our animal kin, we stand a greater chance of 
seeing through the dangerous illusions of a world increasingly dedicated 
to capitalist ideals of wealth, power and success that are defined in stark 
opposition to, or at the expense of, Nature.  
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Another reason why, as environmentalists, we should encourage 
commensal relations between animals and people, especially children, is 
that such relations presumably help to engender human empathy towards 
animals in general, including those in the wild. When people discover 
the unique personalities and communicative capabilities of their animal 
friends and familiars, they are logically drawn to credit other animals 
with such potentialities too, and to extend to them, in principle, a degree 
of consideration commensurate with that which, they have realised, is 
due to the animals of their acquaintance. In this way, animal companions 
can serve as 'ambassadors' for animal life generally, awakening in us new 
levels of awareness and responsibility vis a vis the natural world.  
 
It must be admitted, however, that this 'ambassador' argument is, prima 
facie, open to objection. In the first place, what of the rural people, 
whom we have all encountered, who have been in contact with animals 
throughout their lives, yet who nevertheless treat all animals as totally 
inconsiderable robots? Then there are the people who enjoy 
companionate relationships with particular, privileged animals, yet 
continue to handle the rest with callous indifference. How are we to 
account for the fact that daily contact with animals has not, in these 
instances, led to a more considerate attitude towards animals in general? 
 
One way of accounting for this is via the hypothesis that it was the fact 
of domestication itself, in its more grossly instrumental forms, which led 
to our cultural objectification of animals. That is, according to some 
theorists10, in drawing animals into our domiciliary space, and raising 
them within the circle of the human clan, and then slaughtering them for 
food or other purposes, we in fact violated the taboo against violence 
towards kin. The moral gravity of this transgression then required that 
we rationalize our action by denying the moral significance of domestic - 
and by extension, other - animals, reducing them to the status of objects 
that may be produced and consumed without the slightest compunction. 
In other words, to justify the utilization of animals raised, like kin, within 
the human domain, we invented an ideology of animals as objects, which 
effectively closed our eyes to their otherwise manifest subjectivity.  
Ideology unquestionably can blind us to the subjectivity of others, as is 
plainly attested by the phenomena of slavery, racism and sexism in the 
human context. So the mere fact that we keep 'pets', or come into daily 
contact with other animals, will not of itself ensure that we develop 
empathy for them. Communication between self and other can occur only 
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when occlusive ideologies have been exposed and removed. For 
companion animals to serve as moral 'ambassadors' for the animal world 
at large then, anthropocentric prejudices have first to be set aside.  
 
If it is accepted that companion animals do induce in us a new moral 
seriousness about animals generally, then a question arises concerning 
the status of domestic animals used for productive purposes . Does this 
new moral seriousness condemn the utilization of animals for such 
purposes? If so, is it really in the interests of the species in question, 
since those species owe their very existence, at the present time, to the 
fact that they are so utilized. How ironical it would be if the dawning of 
this new moral seriousness led not to an animal renaissance, but to the 
further retreat of animals both from their present evolutionary 
strongholds and from our own lives? The question then, is whether it is 
possible to reconcile empathy for animals with their domestic 
utilization?  
 
The short answer to this question is, I think, that such reconciliation of 
empathy and use is possible to the extent that utilization is of net benefit 
to the animals concerned.  When those animals are considered as species 
rather than as individuals, it is clear that productive forms of 
domestication have been of net benefit to them: domestic animals are 
some of the few animal species still flourishing in a world of declining 
biodiversity. However, the kind of empathy induced by intimate 
relationships with animal companions leads us to consider animals as 
individuals rather than as mere instances of species. So although 
reproductive success at the level of species is obviously a necessary 
condition for an individual's existence, and is in this sense in its interests, 
it is, equally  obviously, not a sufficient condition for the individual's 
well-being.  
 
To reconcile utilization with empathy, we need to be assured that the life 
that our exploitative intentions bestow on an individual domestic animal 
affords both the experiential opportunities and the requisite life span to 
enable it to achieve a significant degree of the form of self-realization 
appropriate to its particular kind. This implies that the use we may 
justifiably make of animals will vary according to their species: what 
may be an acceptable use of one species with a particular set of needs 
and sensibilities may not be acceptable for a species differently 
endowed. In particular, while humane killing of animals who lack any 
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consciousness of death may be admissible, the killing of animals who 
understand and fear death, and who grieve for their own dead (as do 
elephants and perhaps chimps), may be completely inadmissible, 
involving as it would the systematic infliction of  intolerable suffering. 
Such suffering may, from the point of view of the animals in question, 
cancel the benefits of being alive. (This is evidenced by the fact that such 
animals can pine to death when bereaved11).  
 
In short, I think the fact that domestic utilization affords  evolutionary 
niches for certain species, in a world of disappearing niches, is a prima 
facie reason for regarding such utilization as compatible with respect. 
However a full-blown attitude of empathy - such as we develop through 
intimate association with animal companions - requires that the forms of 
utilization we countenance be compatible with the self-realization of the 
animals used, where this implies that different forms and degrees of 
utilization will be appropriate for different species. I would also add that, 
once we have acknowledged the subjectivity and moral significance of 
the animals we use, and the moral gravity of our practices of utilization, 
it becomes incumbent on us to develop cultural expressions of respect, 
gratitude and indebtedness for the lives we have thus dedicated to our 
own ends. In this way, our attitude towards domestic animals can 
develop more affinity with the familial attitudes of hunter-gatherer 
peoples towards the wild species that constitute their prey. 
 
When domestic utilization of animals is subject to the qualifications I 
have outlined above, I think it is not only consistent with empathetic 
concern for the interests of animals: it is actually required by such 
concern. As environmentalists, committed to the maximal preservation of 
non-human life on earth, yet facing the cold, hard fact that in the 21st 
century, the processes of urbanization and industrialization that have 
been synonymous with the disenchantment and tragic devastation of the 
non-human world are only going to accelerate and intensify, don't we 
have to admit that one of our best chances for 'saving Nature' is by 
bringing Nature back into the human domain. We have, for the last few 
centuries, witnessed the runaway humanization of Nature; now let us 
inaugurate the wholesale naturalization of human habitat. Our cities are 
one of the major biological habitats of the future, and our task, as 
environmentalists, is to ensure that they provide the best opportunities 
for non-human life that we can devise. We can do this partly by 
increasing the amount of urban habitat for wildlife. Such habitat can be 
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created by way of indigenous plantings and by permacultural programs 
of food production in the city. Buildings can also be designed or adapted 
to create, rather than exclude, habitat opportunities for wild animals (by 
way of stork-friendly chimneys, for instance, and roofs that 
accommodate bats and nesting birds). However we can also increase the 
urban opportunities for non-human life by finding new ways for animals 
to 'earn their living' in the city.   
 
How might we envisage some of these new ways? The usefulness of 
sheep as lawn-mowers has been appreciated by a church in my own local 
neighborhood, and there is no reason why other urban land-holders, 
including local councils, should not follow suit. Sheep have also been 
used for traffic calming in the Netherlands, and strategic use of horse-
drawn vehicles - for tourist rides or milk deliveries, for instance - could 
serve a similar purpose. City farms afford educational opportunities for 
urban schoolchildren increasingly distanced from the realities of food 
production. The possibilities for reintegrating animals productively into 
urban life are as limitless as our imaginations. However, the principal 
way in which animals can 'earn their living' in the city is still, I think, via 
their companionate role. The exclusive reign of the dog and the cat in 
this connection needs to be challenged, and the adaptability of other 
species to the human hearth and home investigated. There is immense 
scope for the conservation particularly of - sometimes endangered - 
native species in such a program of domestication. Species such as the 
quoll, or native cat, and the fruit bat, are reputed to make affectionate 
and contented hearth companions, and the domestic potentialities of 
many smaller, endangered wallabies, such as quokkas and bettongs, are, 
so far as I am aware, relatively unexplored. (The quokkas on Rottnest 
Island, offshore from Perth, Western Australia,  have already adapted to 
the kind of  semi-tame, dump-side existence which is, according to 
certain evolutionary theorists12, the first step in a species' self-surrender 
to domestication.) Our reluctance, as 'animal lovers', to countenance 
confinement of wild animals, and the loss of autonomy that 
domestication entails, must be off-set, I think, by the recognition that we 
are just another niche in the biosphere, and hence ourselves a part of 
Nature (the niche in question being one which many species have in the 
past successfully  occupied of their own free will).  This reluctance must 
also be offset against the as yet undreamt-of possibilities for 
conservation13 that domestication offers.  
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The 'green' city of the future, then, would be a mixed community rich in 
habitat opportunities for a great diversity of animal species. This 
reintegration of animals into human life would also help to expand 
human imaginative and empathetic horizons, undermining 
anthropocentrism and reinforcing commitment to the protection of the 
non-human world. At the same time, the multiple contacts with animals 
that it would afford would enhance the health and sanity of the human 
population.  
 
To envisage the green city of the future as a mixed community in this 
way would of course involve considerable re-thinking of current urban 
and environmental planning principles. Restrictions on the ownership of 
native animals would have to be revised, and new local council 
regulations allowing for the responsible keeping of a wide range of 'pets' 
would be required. Housing would  be designed with the needs of both 
wild and tame non-human occupants in mind. Such demands on design 
would not in themselves militate against the medium density housing 
currently favoured by environmental town planners, but they would 
require that 'urban consolidation' be counter-balanced by large increases 
in communal green space. Public spaces would also have to be rendered 
more hospitable to animals, with protection from traffic, and areas 
designated and set aside for inter-species exercise (dogs would 
presumably have to be kept apart from donkeys, miniature pigs and 
quokkas, for instance!). Urban planners who currently concentrate on 
high density development for the sake of energy conservation and 
curtailment of urban sprawl forget that, in excluding non-human beings 
from the city and creating human ghettos, they are intensifying the 
anthropocentric mind-set of urban populations, and thereby reinforcing 
the deepest roots of the environmental crisis. The green city is one which 
not only conserves energy and utilizes existing infrastructure, but also 
challenges the traditional conceptual division between humankind and 
Nature, making itself a frontier of ecological possibility and opening its 
people to the degree of contact with non-human life required to awaken 
their ecological sensibilities.  
 
A Responsive World: Some Personal Reflections   
 
These then are some of the reasons why I think that our living with 
animals is important both for us and for them. However, this 
commensality shapes not only our ethical attitudes towards non-human 
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individuals and species, but our very sense of the world. I have not yet 
brought this larger significance of the relationship fully to light, nor can I 
hope to do so with any pretence of completeness. In order to capture a 
little of this cosmological significance however, I would like to recount, 
in these concluding pages, the experiential origins of my own conviction 
that 'without animals, life isn't worth living'.  
 
I grew up surrounded by loving animals on what today would be 
described as a hobby farm, situated on the rural outskirts of Melbourne, 
Australia.. These animals included dogs and cats, ducks, geese, hens, 
and, at one stage, a turkey. There were brief episodes with sheep and 
cows. The main focus of my entire childhood, however, was my ponies. 
My first pony, and the horses that came after her, were my day-long 
playmates and confidants. It was to them that I recited my earliest poems, 
and to them that I ran when I was hurt or excited. They nuzzled me in the 
same soft, considerate way whatever the occasion. I chose their company 
not for want of family and friends, but for its own sake. The form of 
intimacy that grew up between us was qualitatively different from 
anything that could have developed between myself and human persons. 
It was a kind of uncluttered closeness, or being-with, which existed 
despite the fact that our subjectivities were, in terms of content, mutually 
unknowable. We took it for granted, on either side, that this 
unknowability did not matter, that our psyches could touch and pervade 
each other, without need for explanations or self-disclosures, such as 
those conveyable by language. These animals were, for me, 'primary 
others', in the psychoanalytic sense; they were not substitutes for, but 
additional to, significant humans, nor could humans substitute for them. 
My subjectivity - my sense of self and world - was constituted through 
my 'object relations'14 with these animals just as fundamentally as it was 
through my relations with primary human others.  
 
Domestic animals were not the only non-human influences shaping my 
sense of self and world in those early days. There were also kindly 
ancient gum trees on our land - we knew they dated from before 
colonization because they bore canoe scars in their trunks. And there was 
the creek, steeped in elemental mystery for me, yet at the same time busy 
and loquacious, swirling with news of other unknown yet connected 
places. These, together with my animal family, and the wild birds and 
snakes, all contributed to my sense of a world of communicative 
presences beyond the circle of human concerns.  
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Nor was my childhood home the only place which turned my psyche 
outward in this way. There was also an old sheep station on the vast 
western plains of New South Wales, which I occasionally visited in 
school holidays. It was no ordinary sheep station, but, even in those days, 
a relic of an earlier era. The owner, an old timer with eyes as wide as the 
blue desert sky, had been born in the homestead and raised on the 
property, and he ran the place in the pre-mechanical style, with the aid of 
stock ponies, dogs and horse-drawn buggies. We children were out all 
day in the searing sun on the saltbush plains, lunching out of battered 
tuckerboxes, racing our ponies, chasing kangaroos, emus and wild pigs 
with delirious excitement. Back at the homestead, animals filled our 
every waking moment: there were sheep and lambs, of course, as well as 
the ponies, most of whom spent the main part of the year in a large herd 
out on the range, only coming in for a tour of duty now and again, as the 
need arose. (These tough but happy little horses lived to extraordinary 
ages. One died recently at the age of forty-five!)  Cattle, pigs, tribes of 
chooks, ducks and geese, a flock of diminutive long-haired bush goats, 
an army of dogs, and at different times tame emus and kangaroos all 
congregated around the homestead. An old white goat named Snowy and 
a cocoa-coloured hand-reared filly clattered about on the wide back 
verandah. A sack containing a recently orphan joey usually hung from 
the clothes line over the enormous wood-fired stove in the kitchen.  
 
Compassion and fondness for animals jostled, in the daily round, with 
unabashed slaughter and brutality. From my saddle, I witnessed mother 
kangaroos being torn to shreds by dogs, 'for fun'; emus, in flight from our 
young stockman friends, failing to clear a fence, becoming entangled in 
the wire instead, and being bludgeoned to death with a fence-post; and 
back at the homestead, pigs uttering torture-chamber screams as their 
throats were cut and their still-convulsing bodies dropped into troughs of 
scalding water. I sat with the other kids in the back of a jeep on a 
kangaroo-shooting excursion, and as the bodies piled up under our feet, I 
remember the blood of the kangaroos soaking my green felt boots dark 
red. The cruelty shocked me to the core - in fact, it was this which first 
made me aware of my core, a  still, silent, inner place of watching, 
beyond speech. But it did not diminish the overwhelming sense of 
enchantment that this place awakened in me. (Much, much later, I was to 
discover that the old station had had a similar effect on many of the 
people who had been associated with it.) For the enchantment, and the 
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heightened feeling of being alive that accompanied it, arose from the fact 
that animals - and the uncompromising land which decided their fate - 
were the almost exclusive focus of everyone's life there, and the carnage, 
for all its horror, was part of that all-consuming involvement.  
 
When I was fifteen, my family moved into the inner city, and both my 
rural life, and my visits to the sheep station, ceased. However our new 
home overlooked extensive parklands, and I set up house with a dog in 
an old Victorian loft in our backyard, so the transition was not unduly 
traumatic. It was not until I was eighteen, and I abandoned my home and 
my country to live in London, that a keen sense of loss and deprivation at 
last set in. I moved in with a friend who leased a top-storey studio in the 
Kings Road in Chelsea, and for various reasons I was soon trapped in the 
life I had reluctantly chosen to lead there. The apartment was without a 
garden, without the slightest glimpse of green from its high windows. 
The grand old building in which it was located was legendary as one of 
the nerve-centres of the London 'underground'. Artists, writers and rock 
musicians congregated there, and every night, till dawn, the entire 
building was shaken with musical reverberations from the nightclub in 
the basement. People were embarked on what were for them exciting 
adventures with sex and drugs. The joint was unquestionably jumping. 
With comings and goings at all hours, residents and visitors alike were 
charged to the eyeballs with the fizz of glamour, the intoxication of 
notoriety and celebrity.  
 
I alone, it seemed, languished. I felt deadened.  Without any trees in 
sight, with all presence and memory of animals expunged from this 
world, without even a proper sky above me (the London sky appearing 
more like a low ceiling than the soaring invitation to infinity to which I 
was accustomed in Australia), I felt truly 'underground', buried alive. My 
spirit, with its lifelong habit of expansiveness, had to submit for the first 
time to grey urban confinement, to a world built exclusively to human 
specifications, in which no court of appeal existed beyond socially-
prescribed perceptions and perspectives. There was here no turning out 
to a wider world of subtle voices and signals, a world of myriad, at first 
indiscernible, but with patient attention increasingly differentiated, 
responsive presences. Rather, there was a turning in, and a turning up of 
the volume of human-generated and human-directed self-infatuated 
cacophony and chatter. This turning-in found its ultimate expression in 
the essential project of the counter-culture: to transform reality into an 
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inner picture show, a spectacle of hallucinatory images and sexually 
induced sensations orchestrated for our private entertainment. This 
project was, in fact, nothing more than a hip rendition of the old 
transcendental idealism, or solipsistic anthropocentrism, of the Western 
tradition, which places reality in us rather than us in reality.  
 
I had no words, at the time, to name this human introjection of reality, or 
to justify my sense of exile from a world that was truly alive, and, unlike 
the one in which I found myself, a source of true enlivenment. I 
especially had no words to challenge the high claims of Art on which the 
counter-culture rested. Instead, I kept some snails and bare twigs in a jar 
in my room, and gazed at them for months. I retreated into a state of 
fantasy and intense creativity, writing and drawing obsessively, calling 
up from my own deep unconscious the images and motifs I needed to 
survive. I composed song cycles, and stories of origins, before I had 
heard of Aboriginal dreamings. I hung around old book shops and 
antique stores, seeking out illustrations and folk tales that could be 
threaded into my nascent mythologies. I haunted the Natural History 
Museum in South Kensington, with its layer upon layer, colonnade after 
colonnade, of magical animal statuary. Whenever I found a numinous 
image - an old French engraving of a lone seal, for instance, or a Chinese 
painting of wild geese - I enshrined it, hanging it as a religious icon in 
the gallery of my mind. Out of such gathered fragments, and out of my 
own memory, imagination and dreams, I tried to recreate the sense of 
enchantment that had always been the essence of my experience of the 
world, and without which I did indeed find life scarcely worth living.  
 
From the viewpoint of Western psychoanalysis, this sense of 
enchantment is regressive, and signals a failure of individuation in 
infancy. But to adopt this point of view is, of course, to beg the 
metaphysical question. Looking back on my early years now, it seems 
more plausible to me to assume that the ample opportunities for close 
communion with animals that were available to me throughout my 
childhood had opened me to a larger world, a world astir with presence 
or presences that vastly exceeded the human. It was this direct contact 
with unknowable but pervasive presence which instilled in me a sense of 
the sacredness or enchantment of the world, and the potentiality for 
'magic' within it. 'Magic' was, in this context, just the possibility of the 
world's response - the possibility, indeed probability, that the world, 
when invoked in good faith, will respond, though not necessarily in the 
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manner one anticipates or with the results for which one hopes. One 
should certainly not, in my view, rely on this world to fulfil requests or 
afford protection, but if one entreats it simply to reveal itself, to engage 
in an act of communication, then, in my experience, it will generally do 
so, though in its own ever-unpredictable way. I learned this as a child, 
through the receptiveness that my animal familiars created in me, and it 
filled my whole being with a sense of being accompanied, of never being 
alone, a sense of background love, akin to the background radiation of 
which physicists speak. This is a 'love' which has nothing to do with 
saving us from death and suffering, or with making us happy. From the 
viewpoint of the world, death and suffering are just inevitable 
concomitants of individual life. The point for individuals, from this 
perspective, is not to seek to evade these inevitabilities, but to reach 
beyond them - to call into the silence beyond human selfhood in search 
of a reply. This is the moment for which the world has been waiting, and 
in which it will rejoice: the moment when we ask it to speak. To receive 
its reply is to enter a love far greater than the kind of protection and 
indulgence that our traditional importunate forms of prayer expect, for 
that reply signifies that we belong to an animate order, a pattern of 
meaning, from which death cannot separate us, and to which suffering 
only summons us.  
 
I offer these concluding reflections, not as argument, but as testimony 
relating to my own personal sense of the larger import of human-animal 
commensality, especially when that commensality is established in 
childhood. To engage with the unknowable subjectivities of animals, and 
to experience their response to us, is perhaps the principal bridge to 
communication with the unknowable subjectivity of the wider world. To 
experience the world thus, as an ensouled or spiritual thing, will not only 
direct the course of our own self-realization in the most fundamental 
way; it will also ensure an attitude of profound mutuality and awed 
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